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Investigation into the sequence struc-ture of the genetic code by means of 
an informatic approach is a real success 
story. The features of human language 
are also the object of investigation within 
the realm of formal language theories. 
They focus on the common rules of a 
universal grammar that lies behind all 
languages and determine generation 
of syntactic structures. This universal 
grammar is a depiction of material real-
ity, i.e., the hidden logical order of things 
and its relations determined by natural 
laws. Therefore mathematics is viewed 
not only as an appropriate tool to inves-
tigate human language and genetic code 
structures through computer science-
based formal language theory but is itself 
a depiction of material reality. This con-
fusion between language as a scientific 
tool to describe observations/experiences 
within cognitive constructed models and 
formal language as a direct depiction of 
material reality occurs not only in cur-
rent approaches but was the central focus 
of the philosophy of science debate in 
the twentieth century, with rather unex-
pected results. This article recalls these 
results and their implications for more 
recent mathematical approaches that 
also attempt to explain the evolution of 
human language.
Introduction
In a series of articles Martin Novak tries 
to apply formal language theory to explain 
the evolution of human language. He sug-
gests that the evolution of syntax (gram-
mar) occurs as a simplified rule system 
that itself evolved by natural selection.1,2 
Identification of meaning (semantics) 
occurs through identification of correct 
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syntax. Human language evolved by rep-
resenting the “grammar of the real world 
that is, the underlying logic of how objects 
relate to actions and other objects.”1
Following Noam Chomsky Nowak 
proposes a universal grammar that repre-
sents the inner logic of nature. This inner 
logic of nature forms neuronal networks 
of brain architecture. Because this archi-
tecture depicts the inner logic of nature it 
functions according to natural laws which 
can be analysed by formalisable proce-
dures such as mathematics. Universal 
Grammar specifies the mechanism of 
language acquisition also: “Universal 
Grammar is not learned but is required for 
language learning. It is innate.”3
Because language has evolved to reduce 
communication mistakes “only a universal 
grammar satisfies the coherence threshold 
that can promote the evolution of gram-
matical communication.”3 Alongside 
the 3 billion-year-old generative system 
of the nucleotid language human lan-
guage emerged as a comparable generative 
system.4
Nowak is convinced that fundamen-
tal aspects of human language are ame-
nable to formal analysis. In his approach 
mathematics and computer science-based 
formal language theory function as appro-
priate mathematical machinery to deal 
with these phenomena to investigate and 
analyse language-specific rules that gen-
erate meaningful linguistic structures.4 
In this respect, languages, grammar and 
machines have some correspondence: 
context-free languages are generated by 
context-free grammars, which can be 
implemented by push-down automata. 
Context sensitive languages are generated 
by context sensitive grammars. For each 
of these languages there exists a Turing 
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COmmentary
because nucleic acids are arranged accord-
ing to the molecular syntax of this lan-
guage. Through this comparison Manfred 
Eigen follows the depiction theory of lan-
guage within the tradition of mathemati-
cal language theory, systems theory and 
information theory. The world behaves 
according to physically determinable 
natural laws. These natural laws can be 
expressed only by using the language of 
mathematics. The essential rules of a lan-
guage are therefore its syntax.16
The semantic aspect of language ini-
tially comprises an incidentally developed 
or combined sign sequence, a mixture of 
characters, which only gains significance 
in the course of specific selection pro-
cesses. The linguistic signs are variables 
whose syntax is subject to the natural laws 
governing the neuronal architecture of 
the sign-using brain organ. The brain of 
humans is endowed with these variables 
and combines them to reflect synapse 
network logics. The variable sign syn-
tax of the brain must then be filled with 
experiences of a personal nature and thus 
constitutes an individualised evaluation 
scheme. In messages between communi-
cation partners, one side encodes the mes-
sage in phonetic characters. The receiver 
must then decode and interpret the mes-
sage according to empathy and personal 
experience. Understanding messages 
shared between sender and receiver is pos-
sible largely because the uniform logical 
form—a universal grammar—lies hidden 
behind every language.16
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem: 
Functions Lacking Algorithms  
are Not Calculable
A similar situation (but more than 40 years 
before Eigen) is encountered in the attempt 
to absolutise mathematics as a purely for-
mal language. This led Gödel to formulate 
the Unvollständigkeitssatz (incompleteness 
theorem) in his work Über formal unents-
cheidbare Sätze der principia mathematica 
und verwandter Systeme.17
Gödel’s aim was to convert metatheo-
retical statements into arithmetical state-
ments by means of a specific allocation 
procedure. More precisely, he strove to 
convert the statements formulated in a 
meta-language into the object language S 
describe our observations, experiences, 
concepts.9 The important starting-point 
at this stage was that everything we see 
as part of material reality follows a natu-
ral logic of relations according to natu-
ral laws. If we want to describe material 
reality, then we have to investigate and 
describe objects in the realm of physics 
and chemistry, which are the only appro-
priate tools. The only language which is 
able to describe these objects and their 
relations is mathematics.10 Every sentence 
with which observations are described as 
well as sentences which are used to con-
struct theories must fulfil the criterion of 
formalisabilty.11 Sentences which are not 
formalisable can be excluded from sci-
ence. Natural laws expressed within the 
language of mathematics represent the 
inherent logic of nature.12 The central 
and most important element of language 
is therefore syntax. Only through syntax 
does the logical structure of a language 
as a depiction of the logical structure of 
nature reveal itself.13
Similarly to this model of language, sys-
tems theory and information theory inves-
tigate the empirical significance of scientific 
sentences by means of a quantifiable set of 
signs and, additionally, the information 
transfer of formalised references between 
a sender and a receiver. Information pro-
cessing systems are therefore quantifiable 
themselves. Understanding information 
is possible because of the logical structure 
of the universal syntax, i.e., by a process 
which reverses the construction of mean-
ing. Therefore information theory is also a 
mathematical theory of language.14,15 Both 
constructions are able to depict reality by 
means of formalized sentences like a pic-
ture or a photo in contrast to sentences 
which describe within the realm of a theo-
retical model. Manfred Eigen took this 
formal language theory to describe the 
genetic code as a regular language.16
Manfred Eigen Adopted this 
 Position Early
Thirty years before Martin Nowak’s 
work Manfred Eigen explicitly compared 
human language with molecular genetic 
language. Both serve as communication 
mechanisms. The molecular constitution 
of genes is possible, according to Eigen, 
machine, which can decide whether it is a 
regular language or not.4
In a more recent work in reference 5, 
Nowak tries to undertake a complete 
mathematical theory of social evolution-
ary dynamics of humans by assuming that 
an “evolving population consists of repro-
ducing individuals, which are information 
carriers. When they reproduce they pass 
on information. New mutants arise if this 
process involves mistakes.”5 Information is 
inherited by replication. Errors (mutation) 
in replication lead to variation. Selection 
leads to survival of the fittest variants.6
The ambitious claim that his mathe-
matical approach is not simply a language-
based scientific concept but a depiction of 
biological reality5 raises the question of 
how to justify scientific sentences and of 
the role of language in general. This was 
the central question in the philosophy of 
science debate in the twentieth century, 
with rather unexpected results.
The Linguistic Turn in the 1930s
One of the key events in the science his-
tory of the 20th century was the debate 
on how to establish an exact scientific lan-
guage. Increasing empirical data had to be 
interpreted correctly to adapt knowledge 
to technical applications. The previous 
2,000 years were dominated by a variety of 
philosophical conceptions that could not 
solve basic problems of empirical investi-
gations and construction of theories.
Modern empiricism wanted to be free 
of metaphysical implications.7 Therefore 
the only serious value as far as science was 
concerned was the rationality of methods 
for reaching scientific knowledge, i.e., the 
formalisable expression of empirical sen-
tences.8 This was called objectivism, and 
it restricts itself to a pure observer perspec-
tive that confirms its observations by mea-
surement techniques and subsumes reality 
in the formalisable depiction of these mea-
surements. Between metaphysics and 
objectivism there is an unbridgeable gap: 
only what can be found empirically and 
described as formalisable exists.
This scientific approach represented a 
fundamental shift in the history of ratio-
nal thinking. It focused not on things, 
the world, processes and their relations 
but conversely the medium in which we 
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semiotic rules and the socialised linguis-
tic competence to build correct sentences 
enable interaction partners to understand 
identical meanings of utterances.19,22
Non-Formal Everyday Language 
as Ultimate Meta-Language
The fact that paradoxes arising within a 
formal language cannot be solved with 
that language led to a differentiation 
between object-language and meta-lan-
guage. Nonetheless, paradoxes can also 
appear within meta-language;23 these can 
only be solved by being split into meta-
language, meta-meta-language and so 
forth in an infinite number of steps. This 
unavoidable gradation of meta-languages 
necessitates resorting to informal speech, 
developed in the context of social expe-
rience, as the ultimate meta-language. 
Informal language is the last instance for 
deciding on the paradoxes emerging from 
object- and meta-languages. The only way 
to decide whether a mathematical formula 
is true or false is by using a non-formal 
language.17 One cannot decide this from 
the formal language itself. With non-for-
mal languages one can easily change from 
formal to non-formal and vice versa.19,22 
Interestingly this is completely impossible 
for formal language.
This non-formal language is the tool 
that enables the language itself to be dis-
cussed.19,22 A computer is unable to do this 
because no algorithm is available with 
which a cybernetic machine can deter-
mine its underlying formal system.
Scientists Learn Formal 
­Languages­in­Scientific­
 Communities
When the pragmatic turn replaced the lin-
guistic turn this was because from now on 
it was not the syntax and semantics that 
were the central focus of investigation of 
languages but (1) the subjects which inter-
act with languages as well as (2) the prag-
matic aspects in which these interacting 
subjects are interwoven and which deter-
mine how an interactional situation is able 
to be constituted as such.19 The comple-
mentarity and non-reductionability of the 
three levels of rules (syntax, pragmatics, 
semantics) which are at the basis of any 
everyday context is always the unity of 
language embedded in actions. This des-
ignates what was later termed “pragmatic 
turn” in contrast to the former “linguistic 
turn.” Whereas in linguistic turn thinking 
the formal order in the syntax (universal 
grammar) played an essential role, now 
it was the context of consortial interact-
ing humans in real life that played a cru-
cial rule in the emergence of meaning in 
speech acts and utterances.
This unity of language and actions 
Wittgenstein called Sprachspiel (language 
game). Game, because as in every game 
so also in language there are certain valid 
rules. It is not possible to choose any kind 
of language to take a position behind the 
practice of a lifeform by means of basic rea-
soning. Language itself is the last bastion 
as the real practice of actions and is pri-
marily a social phenomenon. Wittgenstein 
worked out why it is impossible to con-
struct a private (solus ipse) language. In 
his analysis of the expression “to obey a 
rule,” Wittgenstein provides proof that 
the identity of meanings logically depends 
on the ability to follow intersubjectively 
valid rules with at least one additional sub-
ject; there can be no identical meanings 
for the lone subject. Speaking is a form 
of social action. Meaning is a social func-
tion.19 The rules of language games have 
developed historically as “customs” from 
consortial real-life usage. To understand 
the rules one must co-play within such a 
game. Then one can see the meaning of a 
term because as co-player one gains expe-
rience of how a term is used within this 
play, which rules determine its meaning 
and how the rules may change according 
to varying situations.
Children do not learn language, words 
or sentences by means of innate universal 
grammar in that they reduce mistakes in 
understanding but look at interactional 
motifs of parents and others combined 
with words.19-22 Within social interactions 
they learn “how to do things with words” 
or how to combine words with actional 
motifs.22 Speaking, making propositions 
and understanding utterances do not 
operate by means of a private encoding 
process, and subsequently a private decod-
ing process, but by means of consortially 
shared rule-governed sign-mediated inter-
actions. The shared competence to follow 
by using the object language S. This led 
Gödel to two rather unexpected but far-
reaching conclusions: (1) on the assump-
tion that system S is consistent, then it will 
contain one formally indeterminable theo-
rem, i.e., one theorem is inevitably present 
that can be neither proved nor disproved 
within the system, (2) on the assumption 
that system S is consistent, then this con-
sistency of S cannot be proved within S.
The question of determinability and 
calculability is closely allied with the 
algorithm concept, whereby Eigen pos-
tulated that algorithms are not only con-
cepts of theoretical language, but also 
depict (decision-) behavior in the realm 
of biology and, therefore, are amenable 
to formal analysis. He was convinced that 
everything can be represented in the form 
of algorithms and can thus, in principle 
(after sufficiently thorough analysis), be 
determined. This, however, neglects the 
consequence of the incompleteness theo-
rem for that of the automaton theory of 
Turing and Neumann: a machine can 
principally calculate only those functions 
for which an algorithm can be provided. 
Functions lacking an algorithm are not 
calculable.
Both Manfred Eigen and Martin 
Nowak assumed that the evolution of self-
reproducing and self-organising organisms 
represents the realisation of the universal 
grammar underlying the logical order of 
the world. This universal grammar, as a 
representation of mathematically express-
ible reality, is also the formal basis for the 
evolution of these organisms.
The Pragmatic Turn: Children 
Learn Non-Formal Languages  
in Interactions
In his later work18 Wittgenstein refuted 
his early concept completely by aban-
doning the ideal of a world-depicting 
universal grammar. In contrast to for-
mer concepts which thought that behind 
any language lay a material reality which 
determined the visible order of languages 
(universal grammar) Wittgenstein proved 
that this is not the case. The most essen-
tial background of language is its concrete 
use by consortial interacting humans. The 
meaning of a word is its use (Wittgenstein 
1953). The real use of a language in its 
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syntactic sequences, not the inherent logic 
of grammar.
Biocommunication and Natural 
Genome Editing
Communication in general can be both 
empirically investigated and understood 
as rule-governed sign-mediated interac-
tion.26 This is essentially different from 
chemical-physical interactions in inani-
mate nature, because the latter are not 
governed by semiotic rules. The comple-
mentarity of combinatorial (syntactic), 
context-dependent (pragmatic) and con-
tent-sensitive (semantic) rules is lacking if 
water freezes to ice. In contrast to this the 
presence of these rules that mediate every 
sign use—whether it be indices, icons 
or symbols—is equally valid for human 
communication and communication in 
non-human life.27
From this perspective we can identify 
several code-based communicative com-
petences in non-human animate nature 
that underlie syntactic, pragmatic and 
semantic rules. Investigations in, e.g., 
bacteria,28,29 animals,30,31 fungi32,33 and 
plants34,35 palpably demonstrate that prac-
tically all organisms coordinate by code-
based communication processes. More 
specifically, no coordination between 
cells, tissues, organs and organisms can 
be described appropriately without com-
munication processes. If communication 
functions properly these processes will be 
coordinated in an optimised (selective) 
manner; if they are deformed, coordina-
tion will have deficits or fails.
Interestingly, more and more empirical 
data suggest that the genetic code func-
tions according to the rules of natural lan-
guages. This means that investigations of 
the genetic code must be able to identify 
competent agents that generate nucleotid 
sequences de novo, integrate them into 
host genomes and regulate them according 
to the cellular needs of host organisms36 
and their capability of natural genetic 
engineering.37 The insertion or deletion of 
whole genes and gene sets (up to 100 com-
plete genes within one infection event) by 
viruses, apparently plays a more impor-
tant evolutionary role in genetic change 
than single chance mutations (errors) can 
achieve.38 Think of the remnants of such 
can therefore hardly be explained by syn-
tactic analysis of grammatical structures. 
In this respect syntactic analyses can-
not extract context-dependent meaning, 
because meaning is not a quality of syn-
tactic structures but of context-dependent 
social interactions. This fundamentally 
contradicts computer science-based for-
mal language theory and makes sense in 
terms of saving energy cost as well: not for 
every meaningful content is it necessary to 
generate a unique grammatical structure 
(sentence).
Consequences for Formal 
 Language Theories
Natural language has proved to be a per-
petually open system that cannot guar-
antee definitiveness from within itself.17,23 
The consequences of this debate in the 
twentieth century for the use of mathe-
matics in investigating natural languages/
codes are rather surprising:
• There can be no formal system which is 
entirely reflectable in all its aspects while at 
the same time being its own metasystem.
• Concrete communicative acts are basi-
cally unlimited in their possibilities. There 
will always be lines of argumentation that 
lie outside and have no connection with 
an existing system. Every system can be 
transcended argumentatively in prin-
ciple. Newly-emerging language games 
and rules may develop as novel structures 
which are foreign to previous systems and 
not merely a further step in a series of pre-
vailing elements. Therefore completely 
new grammatical coherent sequences are 
not the result of errors or misperceptions.
• The ultimate meta-language, informal 
language, provides indispensable evidence 
about the communication practice of con-
sortial subjects in the real environment; 
operators of formalisations are themselves 
an integral part of this. Reverting to this 
everyday type of communication reveals 
information about the subjects practising 
this usage.
• In natural languages syntactic, prag-
matic and semantic rules must be identifi-
able. If one level of rules is missing, one 
cannot speak about a natural language 
seriously.
• In natural languages pragmatics (con-
text) determines meaning (semantics) of 
natural language used in communicative 
actions were commonsense elements.24
Language therefore is not solely the 
subject of scientific investigation of a tech-
nique for information storage or transport 
but depends primarily on language-using 
consortia (language-game communities) 
of subjects with linguistic and communi-
cative competences in real social contexts 
of a real lifeworld.19-22 On the other hand, 
it is not possible to develop an exact lan-
guage of science which functions like the 
logical order of material reality because 
scientific languages are also spoken by 
real-life subjects and the validity claim 
of objectivism to eliminate all inexact 
parameters of subjects does not function 
even in the scientific language game.
Also, scientific languages depend on 
utterances which are preliminary; they 
are as open as any real-life language and 
therefore can generate real novelties, new 
sentences which did not exist before, and 
therefore are able to progress in knowl-
edge.25 Because utterances in scientific 
languages are subject to debate by sci-
entific communities and are constantly 
under pressure to justify themselves they 
may contribute “in the long run” (Charles 
Sanders Peirce) to progress in knowledge.19
Locutionary and Illocutionary 
Speech Acts
Because subjects share linguistic and com-
municative competences, i.e., can gener-
ate correct sentences and instal reciprocal 
interactions, they are able to differentiate 
rule-based as well as rule-contradictory 
linguistic behaviors. They are able to 
express a variety of meanings with iden-
tical syntactic structures. An utterance 
like, for instance, “the shooting of the 
hunters,” can therefore transport rather 
different meanings which are clearly 
context-dependent.
This led John Austin in his legendary 
speech-act theory20,21 to the differentiation 
of locutionary and illocutionary speech 
acts. He made the assumption that besides 
the superficial (locutionary) grammati-
cal structure of a verbal utterance human 
interactors may perform certain actions 
(performative acts) with an utterance 
that is not explicit (illocutionary) in the 
grammatical structure. Illocutive aspects 
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infection events as still active as regula-
tory consortia that act with cut-and-paste 
(transposons) as well as copy-and-paste 
(retrotransposons) competences to recode 
and recombine genetic content orders and 
their rich regulatory elements.39-42
Conclusion
Besides genetic code and human lan-
guage we are currently able to identify a 
variety of natural languages that are used 
in all kingdoms by organisms to coordi-
nate consortial interactions within and 
between cells, tissues, organs and organ-
isms. Biocommunication designates that 
semiochemicals in signaling codes in 
bacteria, plants, animals and fungi are 
structured by syntactic, pragmatic and 
semantic rules that are absent in inanimate 
nature. Natural genome editing trans-
poses random changes of genetic content 
order by errors (mutation) through com-
petent consortia of agents that edit natural 
languages/codes, e.g., generate nucleotid 
sequences de novo, integrate, regulate 
and—if adaptionally necessary—delete 
genetic content accordingly. This per-
spective seems to be more coherent with 
current knowledge about the role of epi-
genetic modifications, non-coding RNAs, 
early RNA-world hypothesis, RNA-
editing, mobile genetic elements and the 
role of viruses in the evolution of all life 
than error-based (mutation) changes of 
genetic content and their selection as the 
dominant resource of genetic innovation 
as suggested by the formal language the-
ory of mathematics.
